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ACCOUNTING CHOICE DETERMINANTS OF THE DEFERRED TAX ALLOWANCE 
ACCOUNT: AN EARNINGS MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVE 
 
ABSTRACT 
The research is designed to identify accounting choice variables that influence managers’ 
decisions to change the level of the deferred tax asset valuation allowance.  Positive accounting 
theory forms the basis for the analysis.  Only firms that change the valuation allowance are 
included in the empirical analysis.  The results indicate that it is difficult to justify realizability of 
deferred tax assets attributable to net operating loss carryforwards, tax credit carryforward, and, 
partially, deferred compensation, probably because the realization period is long.   The findings 
also indicate that closeness to debt constraints and political costs do not seem to provide any 
impetus for earnings management.  On the other hand, managers of firms with bonus plans tied 
to income are more likely to report a large valuation allowance (decreasing income) when the 
lower bonus threshold is binding.  The results provide consistent support for the idea that firms 
attempt to take a “big bath” rather than smooth their income in years when their earnings are 
below a normal earnings level.  That is, managers take optional loss charges in a bad year to 
clear the way for stronger profits (and bonuses) in future years.  The findings of this paper can 
provide insights into whether it is an appropriate accounting policy to give management 
considerable discretion to choose the level of the valuation allowance. 
 
Key words: Deferred taxes, valuation allowance, earnings management. 
Data Availability: Data used in this study are publicly available from those sources identified in 
the paper. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this study is to identify accounting choice variables that are significant 
determinants of the valuation allowance for deferred tax assets under Statement of Financial 
Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 109, “Accounting for Income Taxes.”  The Statement 
substantially changes the accounting and reporting of deferred tax activities.  Specifically, SFAS 
No. 109 permits the recognition of all deferred tax assets (including those generated by 
deductible temporary differences, operating loss carryforwards, and tax credit carryforwards), 
subject to the reduction by a valuation allowance if it is more likely than not that some portion or 
all of the deferred tax assets will not be realized.  From year to year, managers must make an 
assessment to determine whether to record or adjust the deferred tax asset and valuation 
allowance accounts.  Several observers (e.g., Miller & Skinner, 1998; Visvanathan, 1997, 1998) 
had indicated that the valuation allowance can be an instrument for earnings management 
because any changes in the valuation allowance affect income from continuing operations, and 
SFAS No. 109 considers future profitability of the firm as a whole, which involves a 
considerable amount of subjectivity. 
Positive accounting theory forms the basis for the analysis.  The analysis includes 
investigation of the relationships among observed valuation allowance changes and closeness to 
debt constraints, thresholds of income-based bonus plans, political sensitivity, “big bath” 
approach, and income smoothing.  Regression analysis is used to determine which factors 
influence managers’ decisions to change the level of the valuation allowance.  The sample 
utilized in this study includes all publicly traded firms in the Compact Disclosure database that 
recorded deferred tax assets within a four-year period ended December 31, 2003.  Only firms 
that change the valuation allowance are included in the empirical analysis. 
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The results suggest that it is difficult to justify realizability of deferred tax assets 
attributable to net operating loss carryforwards, tax credit carryforwards, and temporary 
differences associated with deferred compensation, probably because the realization period is 
long.  The findings also indicate that closeness to debt constraints and political costs do not seem 
to provide any impetus for earnings management.  However, the findings of this study provide 
some support for the hypothesis that managers of firms with bonus plans tied to income are more 
likely to choose a larger valuation allowance when the lower bonus threshold is binding.  
Specifically, this study found that firms attempt to take a “big bath” rather than smooth their 
income in years when their earnings are below a normal earnings level.  Overall, the results show 
that a good deal of variation in the valuation allowance is explained by the “big bath” motivation. 
The results of this study are consistent with the earlier research.  A review of prior 
research indicates that few studies specifically tested earnings management in the context of 
valuation allowance.  Miller and Skinner (1998) used a sample of 200 firms that took large Other 
Post-Employment Benefit (OPEB) charges when they adopted SFAS No. 106, “Employers’ 
Accounting for Post-Retirement Benefits Other Than Pensions.”  The authors found no direct 
association between changes in the valuation allowance and either changes in leverage or a proxy 
for the incentive to smooth earnings.  Using firms in the Standard & Poor’s 500 index, 
Visvanathan (1997, 1998) also found no support for the debt/equity or income smoothing 
hypothesis.  Different from Miller and Skinner (1998) and Visvanathan (1997, 1998), Chao, 
Kelsey, Horng, and Chiu (2004) explored the significant determinants of the deferred tax asset 
valuation allowance using a sample of large as well as small U.S. public firms.  They found that 
valuation allowances appeared to vary inversely with earnings, suggesting that firms attempted 
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to take a “big bath” rather than smooth their income in years when their earnings were below a 
normal earnings level. 
This study expands on the extant research in two substantive ways.  First, this paper 
examines an accounting choice indicator, thresholds of bonus plans, as a determinant of 
valuation allowances that have not been considered in previous studies on SFAS No. 109.   
Second, in contrast to previous research that examined the aggregate level of deferred tax assets, 
this study performs a more focused analysis by examining the components of deferred tax assets 
(e.g., deductible temporary differences, operating loss carryforwards, tax credit carryforwards).  
The results could provide insights into the types of deferred tax assets that are most likely to be 
reserved. 
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  The first section summarizes the 
relevant accounting requirements for deferred tax asset measurement.  The second section 
presents the research hypotheses.  The third section describes the variables used in this study.  
The fourth section presents a brief discussion of the sample selection and provides a descriptive 
overview of the sample.  The fifth section reports the findings.  Summary and conclusions are 
provided in the final section. 
II. HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Positive account theory (see Watts & Zimmerman, 1986), a subset of Jensen and 
Meckling’s (1976) agency theory, provides an explanation of managers’ accounting choices and 
establishes the existence of motives for earnings management.  Based on the accounting choice 
literature, a number of variables (closeness to debt covenant restrictions, thresholds of bonus 
plans, political sensitivity, “big bath” behavior, and income smoothing) are hypothesized to 
affect managerial discretion over the valuation allowance. 
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Debt/Equity 
The debt/equity hypothesis (H1) suggests that managers of firms facing higher 
contracting and monitoring costs of debt are more likely to make income-increasing accounting 
decisions than managers of firms facing lower contracting and monitoring costs of debt.  
Specifically, increases in earnings ease dividends, interest coverage, and leverage restrictions.  If 
the debt/equity hypothesis can be used to explain managerial discretion over the valuation 
allowance, then it can be argued that managers of firms that are closer to violating the 
accounting-based constraints contained in debt covenants have stronger incentives to choose to 
reduce the valuation allowance (and increase income).  To test this prediction, the proxy used in 
this study for restrictiveness of debt covenants is leverage (debt/equity).  Thus, the initial 
hypothesis to be tested, stated in the alternative form, is: 
H1:  Ceteris paribus, managers of firms with higher leverage are more likely to choose a 
smaller valuation allowance. 
 
Bonus Plan Thresholds 
The details of the bonus calculations vary across plans.  Specifically, bonus plans usually 
provide a maximum amount of compensation, normally some portion of reported earnings over a 
target level of income, which can be transferred to the “bonus pool” from which bonuses are paid.  
If reported earnings are less than the target measure, no bonuses can be granted.  Thus, 
managers’ incentives to report the magnitude of earnings in a given year may vary with these 
details of bonus calculations.  Prior studies (e.g., Healy, 1985) have posited that managers are 
more likely to choose income-decreasing accounting procedures when their bonus plan upper or 
lower bounds are binding, and income-increasing procedures when these bounds are not binding.  
This suggests that managers of firms with bonus plans tied to income are more likely to choose 
to record a large valuation allowance when the upper or lower bonus threshold is binding, and 
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record a small valuation allowance when both the lower and the upper bounds are not binding.  
Accordingly, the two modified bonus plan hypotheses, stated in alternative form, are: 
H2a:  Ceteris paribus, among firms with bonus plans tied to income, there is a negative 
relation between valuation allowance and the difference between the upper bonus 
threshold and operating earnings, conditional on meeting the lower bonus threshold.
 
H2b:  Ceteris paribus, among firms with bonus plans tied to income, there is a positive 
relation between valuation allowance and an indicator variable for whether 
operating earnings are below the lower bonus threshold. 
 
Political Costs  
The political costs hypothesis (H3) suggests a positive relationship between political 
sensitivity and the probability of adopting accounting procedures that decrease reported earnings.  
The political costs imposed on the firms are a function of their size because larger companies are 
more visible and, therefore, more subject to government scrutiny and wealth transfers.  Since 
accounting numbers, specifically reported earnings, are hypothesized to influence the actions of 
regulatory agencies, managers of large firms may have an incentive to make income-decreasing 
accounting decisions in order to avoid political attention.  If the political costs hypothesis can be 
used to explain managerial discretion over the valuation allowance, then it can be argued that 
managers of larger, more visible firms have greater motivation to choose a larger valuation 
allowance (decreasing income) compared to managers of smaller firms.  The third hypothesis to 
be tested, stated in the alternative form, is: 
H3:  Ceteris paribus, managers of larger firms are more likely to choose a larger 
valuation allowance. 
 
Big Bath 
The big bath hypothesis (H4) suggests that firms “save up” discretionary losses or 
accruals and then record several in a period in which the firm has already experienced below 
normal earnings.  In other words, if a manager cannot manipulate earnings to reach a “target” 
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level, he/she will attempt to decrease current earnings in favor of increasing future earnings and, 
therefore, future bonuses.  Because increases (decreases) in the valuation allowance decrease 
(increase) income, companies with a decline in earnings are predicted to choose to increase the 
valuation allowance.  For purposes of this study, the “target” level of income is defined as the 
prior years’ reported earnings.  This leads to the second hypothesis to be tested, stated in the 
alternative form: 
H4:  Ceteris paribus, managers of firms for which current period earnings are negative 
and lower than the prior year’s reported earnings are more likely to choose a larger 
valuation allowance. 
 
Income Smoothing 
The income smoothing hypothesis (H5) suggests that managers use their accounting 
discretion to reduce the magnitude of the deviation of reported earnings from an earnings number 
that is “normal” or “expected” for the firm.  This study, similar to Miller and Skinner (1998) and 
Visvanathan (1997, 1998), treats earnings management as an empirical issue and tests income 
smoothing without exploring why firms engage in this activity.  If the income smoothing 
hypothesis can be used to explain managerial discretion over the valuation allowance, then it can 
be argued that managers of firms are more likely to choose to decrease the valuation allowance 
(and increase income) in years when earnings are temporarily depressed and to increase the 
valuation allowance (and decrease income) in years when earnings are temporarily high.  The 
third hypothesis to be tested, stated in the alternative form, is: 
H5:  Ceteris paribus, changes in earnings (exclusive of valuation allowance effects) are 
positively correlated with changes in valuation allowance. 
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III. VARIABLES MEASUREMENT 
Among the variables hypothesized to affect managerial discretion over the valuation 
allowance are: closeness to debt covenant restrictions, “big bath” approach, and income 
smoothing.  These variables are proxied in the model as follows. 
Dependent Variable 
To test the hypotheses, the dependent variable (DTVA) is measured as the change in the 
deferred tax asset valuation allowance divided by the deferred tax asset.  An analysis of changes 
in the valuation allowance is informative because it provides evidence on whether and how 
managers of a given firm change the allowance from one year to the next, which is central to the 
research hypotheses in this study.  This variable is gathered from the Compustat database. 
Independent Variables 
 The debt/equity hypothesis (H1) was tested using the leverage variable (LEV), which is 
defined as the firm’s ratio of the book value of total debt to the book value of shareholders’ 
equity at year-end.  This variable was used as a proxy for closeness to debt covenant restrictions 
and was gathered from the Compustat database.  H1 asserts that LEV is negatively related to 
DTVA. 
 Some support for the use of the debt/equity proxy was provided by Duke and Hunt (1990) 
and Press and Weintrop (1990).  Duke and Hunt (1990) found that the debt/equity ratio was 
positively related to the existence and tightness of three common debt covenant restrictions 
(related to retained earnings, working capital, and net tangible assets).  Press and Weintrop (1990) 
reported that, for firms with accounting constraints in their debt agreements, the ratio of total 
debt to the book value of shareholders’ equity was correlated with proximity to the actual 
leverage constraint in debt covenants. 
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The influence of bonus plans on DTVA may vary with the magnitude of earnings.  
Specifically, managers of firms with bonus plans tied to income are more likely to choose to 
record a large valuation allowance when the upper or lower bonus threshold is binding, and 
record a small valuation allowance when both the lower and the upper bounds are not binding.  
The relation between the deferred tax asset valuation allowance and bonus plan incentives will 
be tested using the measures of the implied threshold effects developed by Bartov (1993).1   His 
definition of the upper bound effect as the distance from the upper bonus threshold means that 
the variable is increasing negative as pre-tax earnings rise above the upper threshold and 
increasing positive as pre-tax earnings fall below the threshold.  Following this perspective, 
BONUSUPP measures the difference between the upper threshold and operating earnings (i.e., a 
before-tax income number), conditional on the existence of the earnings-based bonus plan as 
well as meeting the lower threshold, 2  while BONUSLOW is a dummy variable coded one if the 
firm maintains a management bonus plan that is based on reported income and if operating 
earnings fall below the lower bonus threshold, and zero otherwise. 3   Similar to Bartov (1993), 
lower and upper thresholds of (5 percent, 10 percent), (10 percent, 20 percent), and (20 percent, 
30 percent) of the firm’s market value of equity will be tested, respectively.  The variables 
BONUSUPPand BONUSLOW will be used to test H2a and H2b, respectively.  A negative 
(positive) relationship between BONUSUPP (BONUSLOW) and DTVA is predicted. 
                                                 
1 Bartov (1993) defined the lower and upper bounds of the bonus plan as a percentage of the firm’s market value of 
equity (MV) at the beginning of the year.  He tested lower and upper bonus thresholds (X, Y) of (5 percent, 10 
percent), (10 percent, 20 percent), and (20 percent, 30 percent).  If pre-tax income exceeds X percent of MV, then 
BONUSUPP = (Y*MV – pre-tax income) / MV; otherwise BONUSUPP takes the value zero.  If pre-tax income is 
less than X percent of MV, then BONUSLOW is equal to one; else BONUSLOW is coded zero. 
2 The income-smoothing effect and the bonus-plan effect partially overlap.  Thus, one must be controlled for the 
other in the cross-sectional analysis.  For instance, if operating earnings are up from last year and also above the 
upper bound of the bonus plan, managers may choose to record a large valuation allowance to bring the reported 
earnings closer to either last year’s earnings (the income-smoothing effect) or to the upper bound of the bonus plan 
(the bonus-plan effect). 
3 This variable also partially captures the “big bath” phenomenon: if a firm has a loss, managers will increase the 
loss by recording a large valuation allowance.  However, this is not a problem because no inferences are drawn 
about the validity of the bonus plan hypothesis. 
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Firm size is the most commonly used proxy for political sensitivity.  Although other 
proxies for the political costs have been tried, some simultaneously (e.g., Meyer, Karim, & Gara, 
2000), none has been uncritically acclaimed.  Most of these proxies also suffer from the problem 
that they are expost measures of political costs.  Thus, the political costs hypothesis (H3) was 
tested using firm size as a measure of political costs. 
With respect to political sensitivity as put forth in H3, firm size (SIZE) is measured as the 
firm’s market value of common stock at year-end (MV).  This variable is gathered from the 
Compustat database.  SIZE is expected to be positively associated with DTVA.  Sensitivity of 
the results to other measures of firm size, such as total assets (TA) and net sales (NS), is assessed 
because there is no reason to choose one measure of size over another. 
Operationalizing when a firm is likely to take a “big bath” is a difficult task.  Under the 
big bath hypothesis (H4), the usual prediction is that firms will record discretionary losses and 
accruals in the same period when reported earnings are negative and at a level lower than that in 
the prior year.  Therefore, this study adopts a comparison of current period operating earnings to 
the prior year’s operating earnings, defining an indicator variable BBATH that is coded one if 
current period operating earnings are negative and lower than the prior year’s operating earnings, 
and zero otherwise.  The indicator variable BBATH is designed to capture the firms pursuing a 
big bath strategy. 
 H4 asserts a positive relationship between BBATH and DTVA.  Managers are more likely 
to choose to increase the deferred tax asset valuation allowance (and decrease income) when 
BBATH equals one, indicating a historically low level of operating earnings.  Data on the 
dummy variable BBATH are available from the Form 10-K filings or the Compustat database. 
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 To test the income smoothing hypothesis (H5), a desired or target level of income must be 
specified.  Tests for income smoothing typically assume that the target for smoothing is the prior 
year’s earnings (operating income or net income).  Bartov (1993), relying on Archibald (1967) 
and White (1970), justifies the use of the prior year’s earnings for two reasons: (1) It is relatively 
simple, and (2) it appears more realistic than other definitions, which require managers to 
achieve constant annual growth rates.  To date, there is no evidence that a more complicated or 
more widely used target measure provides a better model of income-smoothing behavior.  
Therefore, this study uses the prior year’s operating earnings, excluding the effect of changes in 
deferred taxes, as the target income measure. 
The difference between current year’s operating income and the target income level (i.e., 
the prior year’s operating earnings) represents the amount of discretionary income or loss that a 
firm must recognize in order to reach its desired level of earnings.  For tests of H5, change in 
current period operating earnings is divided by total assets to form the variable EARN.  Data on 
current period operating earnings and total assets are gathered from the Form 10-K filings or the 
Compustat database.  H5 predicts that EARN is positively associated with DTVA. 
Control Variables 
 Due to the potential differences in the relationships between the components of deferred 
tax assets and the valuation allowance, the sources of deferred tax assets are disaggregated into 
four categories:  net operating loss carryforwards (NOL), and other carryforwards such as tax 
credit carryforwards (OC), temporary differences related to other postretirement benefits (OPEB) 
and deferred compensation (DC).  These four components are identified based on previous 
research of frequently cited components.  Net operating loss carryforwards and tax credit 
carryforwards are a source of deferred tax assets because a firm can offset current losses against 
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future taxable income.  The change in each of the specific components of deferred tax assets 
from one year to the next is deflated by lagged deferred tax assets in the cross-sectional analysis.  
A positive relation between DTVA and the proportion of deferred tax assets that result from 
NOL and OC, respectively, is expected.  For the other components of deferred tax assets, no sign 
prediction about the relation with DTVA is made.   OPEB and DC are included only as controls.  
A significant, positive coefficient on a component of the deferred tax asset would indicate that it 
is difficult to justify realizability of the deferred tax asset.  On the other hand, a negative 
coefficient would suggest that firms could more easily justify realizability.  Data on NOL, OC, 
OPEB, and DC are available from the Form 10-K filings. 
IV. SAMPLE SELECTION AND DATA DESCRIPTION 
 A search of all firms included in the Compact Disclosure database is used to identify 
companies that recorded deferred tax assets in any event year within a four-year period ended 
December 31, 2003, regardless of whether they recorded a deferred tax asset valuation allowance.  
The search is performed on the text string “deferred tax asset.”  The entire population of deferred 
tax asset firms must be included because companies are required to report their valuation 
allowance position whether they record a zero or positive value for this account. 
 To be subsequently included in the sample, firms must (1) have SIC codes among 2000-
3999, 5000-5999, and 7000-8799, (2) use December 31 as their year-end, (3) have a deferred tax 
asset/total asset ratio of at least 0.01 for the years ended 2001-2003, and (4) have detailed 
disclosures relating to the components of the deferred tax asset and valuation allowance for the 
years ended 2001-2003.  The SIC code restriction is used to exclude firms in the regulated 
industries (e.g., utility, transportation, insurance, financial services) from the sample because 
these firms may behave differently as a result of the added incentives and limitations associated 
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with regulation.  Firms that are acquired or merged are also excluded.  Using calendar year-end 
criterion in selecting the sample eliminates potential bias associated with differing time periods 
such as varying economic circumstances.  The restriction on deferred tax asset/total asset ratio is 
used to ensure that sample firms have at least a minimum level of deferred tax assets relative to 
total assets on their balance sheets.  Limiting the sample with these criteria, 465 firms remain 
resulting in 1,395 firm-year observations for the three-year period ended December 31, 2003.   
Data were collected from the Compustat database and from annual reports/Form 10-K 
filings and proxy statements found on the SEC’s EDGAR and Lexis-Nexis databases.  All 
variables used in this study were gathered for the years ended 2001-2003. 
Table 1 presents the industry information about the sample.  The breakdown indicates a 
fairly even distribution across the various industries, with only two industries containing more 
than 10% of the sample firms.  These industries are business services (10.97%) and industrial 
machinery and equipment (10.75%).  Moreover, the full sample was compared to the industry 
classifications of the entire original population.  The sample of firms and industries is not 
significantly different from the entire population. 
Descriptive statistics for the variables of interest in 2001, 2002, and 2003 are presented in 
Tables 2, 3, and 4, respectively. 4   Only firms that changed the valuation allowance were 
included in the empirical analysis.  The analysis of changes in the valuation allowance provides 
evidence on whether and how managers of a given firm change the allowance from one year to 
the next, which is central to the research hypotheses in this study.  Changes in the valuation 
allowance were non-zero for 337 firms in 2001, 346 firms in 2002, and 332 firms in 2003.  
                                                 
4 Given the nature of the leverage variable, any firm with a negative debt/equity ratio was given a debt/equity ratio 
of seven.   In addition, the values of debt/equity ratios larger than seven were set to seven.  The univariate and 
multivariate analyses were performed using a maximum of five, seven, and nine without a significant change in the 
estimated coefficients.  The reported results use the maximum of seven. 
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 Based on the distribution of changes in the valuation allowance, it is evident that 
managers of many firms do not change the allowance very much from one year to the next.  For 
instance, the mean (median) DTVA is 0.24 (0.04) in 2001, 0.23 (0.03) in 2002, and 0.22 (0.03) in 
2003.  There is also a strong relation between the likelihood that managers set the valuation 
allowance at zero and the likelihood that managers change the allowance from one year to the 
next.  Of the 129 firms that set the valuation allowance at zero in 2001, 108 (83.72%) also had no 
allowance in 2000.  On the contrary, of the 337 firms with a positive value for the valuation 
allowance in 2001, 303 (89.91%) changed the dollar amount of the allowance from the level set 
in 2000.  The numbers are similar for the two subsequent event years, indicating that some firms 
set the valuation allowance at zero initially and then leave it unchanged in subsequent years 
while other firms set a non-zero allowance and change the dollar amount each year. 
BBATH indicates that current period operating earnings are negative and lower than the 
prior year’s operating earnings for 86 (25.52%) firms in 2001, 73 (21.10%) firms in 2002, and 79 
(23.80%) firms in 2003.  These firms are in poor financial condition and, therefore, are more 
likely to take a “big bath.” 
V. RESULTS 
 Multivariate testing is performed by estimating the following regression model: 
DTVA = β0 + β1LEV + β2BONUSUPP + β3BONUSLOW + β4SIZE + β5BBATH + β6SMOOTH 
+ β7NOL + β8OC + β9OPEB + β10DC + ε 
where DTVA, LEV, BONUSUPP, BONUSLOW, SIZE, BBATH, EARN, NOL, OC, OPEB, and 
DC variables are the same as those defined earlier in this study; βs are the regression coefficients; 
ε is the random error component. 
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 In addition to estimating the full model with all the variables of interest, the stepwise 
method of estimating the regression is utilized to further explore the model by adding or deleting 
a single independent variable at each step to arrive at a final, reduced model that is considered 
“the best.”  The results between the full models and the reduced models (not reported in tables) 
are very similar. 
As discussed earlier in this study, the political costs hypothesis was expanded to include 
three different proxies (i.e., MV, NS, TA) for firm size.  These proxies were highly correlated 
with each other and could not be included in the same model.  Therefore, multiple regression 
models were estimated with each of these measures of firm size separately for each of the three 
event years.  The results for the nine significant models are not qualitatively different.  Tables 5 
through 7 report results for the regression model using MV to proxy for firm size. 
The results for the control variables, changes in the components of deferred tax assets, are 
generally consistent with what were expected.  The estimated coefficients on the changes in 
deferred tax assets that are attributable to NOL and OC are significantly positive in all the year-
by-year equations.  In addition, the estimated coefficient on DC for the year 2003 is statistically 
positive.  The positive associations between these components of deferred tax assets (i.e., NOL, 
OC, DC) and DTVA are consistent with the hypothesis that changes in net operating loss 
carrying forwards, tax credit carryforwards, and deferred compensation provide evidence on 
future realizability of deferred tax assets.  
The results for all of the regression models are not qualitatively different.  The LEV and 
MV variables are not significantly related to DTVA in all regression equations.   The implication 
is that closeness to debt constraints and political sensitivity does not seem to provide any impetus 
for earnings management.  Sensitivity analysis was conducted using net sales (NS) and total 
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assets (TA) to proxy for firm size instead of market value of common stock (MV).  The results 
are not qualitatively different (not reported in tables).   
For bonus plan lower (upper) thresholds of 5 percent (10 percent), the results indicate that 
the BONUSUPP variable is not significantly associated with DTVA.  The predicted positive 
relation for the BONUSLOW variable is consistent with managers reporting relatively higher 
valuation allowance for deferred tax assets (decreasing income) when their bonus plan lower 
bounds are binding.  However, these bonus plan threshold results must be interpreted with 
caution because they are sensitive to the lower (upper) bound definitions as 5 percent (10 
percent), 10 percent (20 percent), and 20 percent (30 percent) of the firm’s market value of 
equity, respectively.  As alternative thresholds of 10 percent (20 percent) or 20 percent (30 
percent) are tested, the estimated coefficients for these alternative thresholds are not significant 
(not reported in tables). 
The coefficient estimate on EARN is not statistically significant in all the regression 
models.  On the other hand, the coefficients on BBATH indicate a significant positive relation to 
DTVA in all regression specifications.  Given that the big bath firms all had negative earnings 
changes, these findings indicate that although these firms had negative operating earnings at a 
level lower than the prior year’s operating earnings, they still attempted to take a “big bath” 
rather than smooth their earnings.  The significant coefficients on BONUSLOW and BBATH 
appear to suggest that managers take optional loss charges in a bad year to clear the way for 
stronger profits (and bonuses) in future years. 
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study explores accounting choice variables that are significant determinants of the 
valuation allowance for deferred tax assets under SFAS No. 109.  Because any changes in the 
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valuation allowance affect income from continuing operations, and because the Statement 
considers future profitability of the firm as a whole, which involves a considerable amount of 
subjectivity, many have expressed concerns that valuation allowance can be an instrument for 
earnings management.  However, little academic research has been devoted to testing the 
earnings management assertions by analyzing factors influencing the measurement of the 
valuation allowance.  The results of this study can help clarify the findings of the related studies 
on SFAS No. 109. 
The results suggest that it is difficult to justify realizability of deferred tax assets 
attributable to net operating loss carryforwards, other carryforwards such as tax credit 
carryforwards, and temporary differences associated with deferred compensation, probably 
because the realization period is long.  The findings also indicate that closeness to debt 
constraints and political costs do not seem to provide any impetus for earnings management.  
However, the findings of this study provide some support for the hypothesis that managers of 
firms with bonus plans tied to income are more likely to choose a larger valuation allowance 
when the lower bonus threshold is binding.  Specifically, this study found that firms attempt to 
take a “big bath” rather than smooth their income in years when their earnings are below a 
normal earnings level.  Overall, the results show that a good deal of variation in the valuation 
allowance is explained by the “big bath” motivation. 
This study expands on the extant research in two substantive ways.  First, this paper 
examines an accounting choice indicator, thresholds of bonus plans, as a determinant of 
valuation allowances that have not been considered in previous studies on SFAS No. 109.   
Second, in contrast to previous research that examined the aggregate level of deferred tax assets, 
this study performs a more focused analysis by examining the components of deferred tax assets 
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(e.g., deductible temporary differences, operating loss carryforwards, tax credit carryforwards).  
The results could provide insights into the types of deferred tax assets that are most likely to be 
reserved. 
 This study does not include all of the potential accounting choices that impact reported 
earnings.  The research examines whether the accounting decision to change the level of the 
deferred tax asset valuation allowance is being used to manage earnings.  By looking at only one 
accounting choice, this study provides an incomplete view of the effect of managers’ accounting 
decisions on reported earnings.  Other accounting choices, such as inventory valuations, 
depreciation methods, investment tax credit accounting methods, pension and postretirement 
benefit assumptions, and accrual decisions, also impact reported income.  In many cases the 
income effects of these accounting decisions are not noticeable because they are not separately 
disclosed in the financial statements.  Thus, this study assumes that other accounting choices are 
made independent of managers’ decisions to change the valuation allowance. 
 In establishing the valuation allowance for deferred tax assets, SFAS No. 109 requires 
consideration of both current and future profitability.  Specifically, the Statement discourages 
changes in the valuation allowance that simply mimic changes in current earnings (FASB, 1992, 
para. 102).  The findings of this study suggest a different behavior, however.  A negative 
relationship is observed between changes in current profitability and changes in the valuation 
allowance, increasing the variations in current profitability over time.  Specifically, the results of 
this study indicate that a good deal of variation in the valuation allowance and current earnings is 
explained by the “big bath” motivation. 
Overall, the information gained from this research provides a better understanding of the 
earnings management potential permitted by the FASB, through managerial discretion over the 
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valuation allowance, for this particular pronouncement and industries.  Evidence of earnings 
management motivations can provide insights into whether it is an appropriate accounting policy 
to give management considerable discretion to choose the level of the valuation allowance.  This 
study provides empirical evidence that contributes to the extant literature on deferred taxes as 
well as expands our knowledge regarding earnings management. 
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TABLE 1 
Industry Information of Sample Companies 
 
SIC Code Industry No. of Firms % of Sample
2000 
2100 
2200 
2300 
2400 
2500 
2600 
2700 
2800 
2900 
3000 
3100 
3200 
3300 
3400 
3500 
3600 
3700 
3800 
3900 
5000 
5100 
5200 
5300 
5500 
5600 
5700 
5800 
5900 
7000 
7300 
7500 
7800 
7900 
8000 
8100 
8200 
8300 
8700 
Food and Kindred Products 
Tobacco Products 
Textile Mill Products 
Apparel and Other Textile Products 
Lumber and Wood Products 
Furniture and Fixtures 
Paper and Allied Products 
Printing and Publishing 
Chemical and Allied Products 
Petroleum and Coal Products 
Rubber and Misc. Plastics Products 
Leather and Leather Products 
Stone, Clay, and Glass Products 
Primary Metal Industries 
Fabricated Metal Products 
Industrial Machinery and Equipment 
Electronic and Other Electric Equipment 
Transportation Equipment 
Instruments and Related Products 
Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industry 
Wholesale Trade – Durable Goods 
Wholesale Trade – Nondurable Goods 
Building Materials and Garden Supplies 
General Merchandise Stores 
Automotive Dealers and Service Stations 
Apparel and Accessory Stores 
Furniture and Home Furnishings Stores 
Eating and Drinking Places 
Miscellaneous Retail 
Hotels and Other Lodging Places 
Business Services 
Auto Repair, Services, and Parking 
Motion Pictures 
Amusement and Recreation Services 
Health Services 
Legal Services 
Educational Services 
Social Services 
Engineering and Management Services 
14 
2 
7 
8 
3 
5 
6 
7 
43 
4 
8 
2 
4 
17 
14 
50 
44 
13 
33 
8 
13 
6 
3 
5 
2 
1 
4 
19 
10 
9 
51 
2 
3 
7 
21 
1 
3 
4 
9 
3.01
0.43
1.51
1.72
0.65
1.08
1.29
1.51
9.25
0.86
1.72
0.43
0.86
3.66
3.01
10.75
9.46
2.80
7.10
1.72
2.80
1.29
0.65
1.08
0.43
0.22
0.86
4.09
2.15
1.94
10.97
0.43
0.65
1.51
4.52
0.22
0.65
0.86
1.94
Total  465 100
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics for Firms that Change the Valuation Allowance in 2001 
N = 337 Firms 
 
 
Variable 
 
Mean 25% Median
 
75% 
Standard 
Deviation
DTVA 
LEV 
BONUSUPP 
BONUSLOW 
MV 
NS 
TA 
BBATH 
EARN 
NOL 
OC 
OPEB 
DC 
0.240 
1.715 
0.018 
0.463 
6.157 
5.246 
6.584 
0.462 
-0.001 
0.022 
0.008 
0.041 
0.006 
-0.036
0.165
0.000
0.000
3.451
2.945
4.476
0.000
-0.045
-0.432
-0.467
-0.292
-0.165
0.038
0.718
0.000
0.000
5.164
4.457
6.132
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.271 
2.142 
0.060 
1.000 
7.479 
6.547 
7.849 
1.000 
0.002 
0.665 
0.511 
0.062 
0.022 
0.789
2.162
0.421
0.398
3.245
3.451
4.184
0.423
0.354
0.260
0.284
0.312
0.095
 
Notes.  Variables are defined as follows: 
 
DTVA = Change in the deferred tax asset valuation allowance divided by the deferred tax asset at 
the end of the prior year. 
LEV =  Ratio of the book value of total debt to the book value of shareholders’ equity at year-end.
BONUSUPP = The difference between the upper threshold and operating earnings, conditional on the 
existence of the earnings-based bonus plan as well as meeting the lower threshold, and 
zero otherwise. 
BONUSLOW = An indicator variable coded one if the firm maintains a management bonus plan that is 
based on reported income and if operating earnings fall below the lower bonus threshold, 
and zero otherwise.  
MV = The nature logarithm of market value of common stock in millions of dollars at year-end. 
NS = The nature logarithm of net sales in millions of dollars at year-end. 
TA = The nature logarithm of total assets in millions of dollars at year-end. 
BBATH = An indicator variable that equals one if current period operating earnings are negative and 
lower than the prior year’s operating earnings, and zero otherwise. 
EARN = Change in current period operating earnings divided by total assets at the end of the prior 
year. 
NOL = Change in the deferred tax asset attributable to net operating loss carryforwards divided 
by the deferred tax asset at the end of the prior year. 
OC = Change in the deferred tax asset attributable to carryforwards other than NOLs divided by 
the deferred tax asset at the end of the prior year. 
OPEB = Change in the deferred tax asset attributable to other postretirement benefits divided by 
the deferred tax asset at the end of the prior year. 
DC = Change in the deferred tax asset attributable to deferred compensation divided by the 
deferred tax asset at the end of the prior year. 
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TABLE 3 
Descriptive Statistics for Firms that Change the Valuation Allowance in 2002 
N = 346 Firms 
 
 
Variable 
 
Mean 25% Median
 
75% 
Standard 
Deviation
DTVA 
LEV 
BONUSUPP 
BONUSLOW 
MV 
NS 
TA 
BBATH 
EARN 
NOL 
OC 
OPEB 
DC 
0.234 
1.611 
0.023 
0.418 
5.276 
4.630 
5.944 
0.685 
-0.033 
0.052 
0.008 
0.041 
0.006 
-0.042
0.153
0.000
0.000
2.894
2.163
3.476
0.000
-0.078
-0.361
-0.248
-0.160
-0.009
0.027
0.734
0.000
0.000
4.758
3.796
5.271
0.000
-0.043
0.017
0.023
0.012
0.023
0.248 
1.876 
0.075 
1.000 
6.479 
5.014 
6.741 
1.000 
0.004 
0.773 
0.509 
0.042 
0.067 
1.001
2.237
0.452
0.354
4.541
3.895
4.915
0.395
0.457
0.397
0.376
0.284
0.153
 
Notes.  Variables are defined as follows: 
 
DTVA = Change in the deferred tax asset valuation allowance divided by the deferred tax asset at 
the end of the prior year. 
LEV =  Ratio of the book value of total debt to the book value of shareholders’ equity at year-end.
BONUSUPP = The difference between the upper threshold and operating earnings, conditional on the 
existence of the earnings-based bonus plan as well as meeting the lower threshold, and 
zero otherwise. 
BONUSLOW = An indicator variable coded one if the firm maintains a management bonus plan that is 
based on reported income and if operating earnings fall below the lower bonus threshold, 
and zero otherwise.  
MV = The nature logarithm of market value of common stock in millions of dollars at year-end. 
NS = The nature logarithm of net sales in millions of dollars at year-end. 
TA = The nature logarithm of total assets in millions of dollars at year-end. 
BBATH = An indicator variable that equals one if current period operating earnings are negative and 
lower than the prior year’s operating earnings, and zero otherwise. 
EARN = Change in current period operating earnings divided by total assets at the end of the prior 
year. 
NOL = Change in the deferred tax asset attributable to net operating loss carryforwards divided 
by the deferred tax asset at the end of the prior year. 
OC = Change in the deferred tax asset attributable to carryforwards other than NOLs divided by 
the deferred tax asset at the end of the prior year. 
OPEB = Change in the deferred tax asset attributable to other postretirement benefits divided by 
the deferred tax asset at the end of the prior year. 
DC = Change in the deferred tax asset attributable to deferred compensation divided by the 
deferred tax asset at the end of the prior year. 
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TABLE 4 
Descriptive Statistics for Firms that Change the Valuation Allowance in 2003 
N = 332 Firms 
 
 
Variable 
 
Mean 25% Median
 
75% 
Standard 
Deviation
DTVA 
LEV 
BONUSUPP 
BONUSLOW 
MV 
NS 
TA 
BBATH 
EARN 
NOL 
OC 
OPEB 
DC 
0.223 
1.876 
0.020 
0.398 
5.998 
4.789 
6.004 
0.245 
0.010 
0.047 
0.008 
0.041 
0.006 
-0.049
0.184
0.000
0.000
3.072
2.854
4.160
0.000
-0.017
-0.274
-0.219
-0.102
-0.009
0.027
0.854
0.000
0.000
4.795
3.807
5.645
0.000
0.019
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.256 
2.469 
0.058 
1.000 
6.962 
6.106 
7.287 
0.000 
0.056 
0.426 
0.399 
0.120 
0.013 
0.852
2.368
0.407
0.332
3.884
4.018
4.512
0.413
0.528
0.210
0.236
0.247
0.043
 
Notes.  Variables are defined as follows: 
 
DTVA = Change in the deferred tax asset valuation allowance divided by the deferred tax asset at 
the end of the prior year. 
LEV =  Ratio of the book value of total debt to the book value of shareholders’ equity at year-end.
BONUSUPP = The difference between the upper threshold and operating earnings, conditional on the 
existence of the earnings-based bonus plan as well as meeting the lower threshold, and 
zero otherwise. 
BONUSLOW = An indicator variable coded one if the firm maintains a management bonus plan that is 
based on reported income and if operating earnings fall below the lower bonus threshold, 
and zero otherwise.  
MV = The nature logarithm of market value of common stock in millions of dollars at year-end. 
NS = The nature logarithm of net sales in millions of dollars at year-end. 
TA = The nature logarithm of total assets in millions of dollars at year-end. 
BBATH = An indicator variable that equals one if current period operating earnings are negative and 
lower than the prior year’s operating earnings, and zero otherwise. 
EARN = Change in current period operating earnings divided by total assets at the end of the prior 
year. 
NOL = Change in the deferred tax asset attributable to net operating loss carryforwards divided 
by the deferred tax asset at the end of the prior year. 
OC = Change in the deferred tax asset attributable to carryforwards other than NOLs divided by 
the deferred tax asset at the end of the prior year. 
OPEB = Change in the deferred tax asset attributable to other postretirement benefits divided by 
the deferred tax asset at the end of the prior year. 
DC = Change in the deferred tax asset attributable to deferred compensation divided by the 
deferred tax asset at the end of the prior year. 
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TABLE 5 
Multiple Regression Results for the Year 2001 Using MV 
DTVA = 0β  + ∑
=
⋅
5
1i
iβ iX  + ε 
 
Adjusted R2 = 0.412 
Variable Predicted Sign Coefficient Estimate p-value 
Intercept 
X1 = LEV 
X2 = BONUSUPP 
X3 = BONUSLOW 
X4 = MV 
X5 = BBATH 
X6 = SMOOTH 
X7 = NOL 
X8 = OC 
X9 = OPEB 
X10 = DC 
 
- 
- 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
? 
? 
0.027 
0.010 
-0.037 
0.020 
0.001 
0.304 
0.009 
0.357 
0.124 
0.033 
0.287 
0.175 
0.209 
0.349 
0.009 
0.241 
0.000 
0.407 
0.000 
0.057 
0.433 
0.117 
 
Notes.  Variables are defined as follows: 
 
DTVA = Change in the deferred tax asset valuation allowance divided by the deferred tax asset at 
the end of the prior year. 
LEV =  Ratio of the book value of total debt to the book value of shareholders’ equity at year-end.
BONUSUPP = The difference between the upper threshold and operating earnings, conditional on the 
existence of the earnings-based bonus plan as well as meeting the lower threshold, and 
zero otherwise. 
BONUSLOW = An indicator variable coded one if the firm maintains a management bonus plan that is 
based on reported income and if operating earnings fall below the lower bonus threshold, 
and zero otherwise.  
MV = The nature logarithm of market value of common stock in millions of dollars at year-end. 
BBATH = An indicator variable that equals one if current period operating earnings are negative and 
lower than the prior year’s operating earnings, and zero otherwise. 
EARN = Change in current period operating earnings divided by total assets at the end of the prior 
year. 
NOL = Change in the deferred tax asset attributable to net operating loss carryforwards divided 
by the deferred tax asset at the end of the prior year. 
OC = Change in the deferred tax asset attributable to carryforwards other than NOLs divided by 
the deferred tax asset at the end of the prior year. 
OPEB = Change in the deferred tax asset attributable to other postretirement benefits divided by 
the deferred tax asset at the end of the prior year. 
DC = Change in the deferred tax asset attributable to deferred compensation divided by the 
deferred tax asset at the end of the prior year. 
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TABLE 6 
Multiple Regression Results for the Year 2002 Using MV 
DTVA = 0β  + ∑
=
⋅
5
1i
iβ iX  + ε 
 
Adjusted R2 = 0.448 
Variable Predicted Sign Coefficient Estimate p-value 
Intercept 
X1 = LEV 
X2 = BONUSUPP 
X3 = BONUSLOW 
X4 = MV 
X5 = BBATH 
X6 = SMOOTH 
X7 = NOL 
X8 = OC 
X9 = OPEB 
X10 = DC 
 
- 
- 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
? 
? 
-0.019 
0.007 
-0.028 
0.032 
0.012 
0.314 
-0.029 
0.186 
0.308 
-0.080 
0.265 
0.457 
0.261 
0.285 
0.000 
0.517 
0.000 
0.398 
0.000 
0.000 
0.348 
0.142 
 
Notes.  Variables are defined as follows: 
 
DTVA = Change in the deferred tax asset valuation allowance divided by the deferred tax asset at 
the end of the prior year. 
LEV =  Ratio of the book value of total debt to the book value of shareholders’ equity at year-end.
BONUSUPP = The difference between the upper threshold and operating earnings, conditional on the 
existence of the earnings-based bonus plan as well as meeting the lower threshold, and 
zero otherwise. 
BONUSLOW = An indicator variable coded one if the firm maintains a management bonus plan that is 
based on reported income and if operating earnings fall below the lower bonus threshold, 
and zero otherwise.  
MV = The nature logarithm of market value of common stock in millions of dollars at year-end. 
BBATH = An indicator variable that equals one if current period operating earnings are negative and 
lower than the prior year’s operating earnings, and zero otherwise. 
EARN = Change in current period operating earnings divided by total assets at the end of the prior 
year. 
NOL = Change in the deferred tax asset attributable to net operating loss carryforwards divided 
by the deferred tax asset at the end of the prior year. 
OC = Change in the deferred tax asset attributable to carryforwards other than NOLs divided by 
the deferred tax asset at the end of the prior year. 
OPEB = Change in the deferred tax asset attributable to other postretirement benefits divided by 
the deferred tax asset at the end of the prior year. 
DC = Change in the deferred tax asset attributable to deferred compensation divided by the 
deferred tax asset at the end of the prior year. 
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TABLE 7 
Multiple Regression Results for the Year 2003 Using MV 
DTVA = 0β  + ∑
=
⋅
5
1i
iβ iX  + ε 
 
Adjusted R2 = 0.472 
Variable Predicted Sign Coefficient Estimate p-value 
Intercept 
X1 = LEV 
X2 = BONUSUPP 
X3 = BONUSLOW 
X4 = MV 
X5 = BBATH 
X6 = SMOOTH 
X7 = NOL 
X8 = OC 
X9 = OPEB 
X10 = DC 
 
- 
- 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
? 
? 
-0.001 
0.015 
-0.045 
0.028 
0.009 
0.313 
0.054 
0.367 
0.159 
-0.052 
0.328 
0.879 
0.365 
0.195 
0.000 
0.297 
0.000 
0.265 
0.000 
0.004 
0.390 
0.026 
 
Notes.  Variables are defined as follows: 
 
DTVA = Change in the deferred tax asset valuation allowance divided by the deferred tax asset at 
the end of the prior year. 
LEV =  Ratio of the book value of total debt to the book value of shareholders’ equity at year-end.
BONUSUPP = The difference between the upper threshold and operating earnings, conditional on the 
existence of the earnings-based bonus plan as well as meeting the lower threshold, and 
zero otherwise. 
BONUSLOW = An indicator variable coded one if the firm maintains a management bonus plan that is 
based on reported income and if operating earnings fall below the lower bonus threshold, 
and zero otherwise.  
MV = The nature logarithm of market value of common stock in millions of dollars at year-end. 
BBATH = An indicator variable that equals one if current period operating earnings are negative and 
lower than the prior year’s operating earnings, and zero otherwise. 
EARN = Change in current period operating earnings divided by total assets at the end of the prior 
year. 
NOL = Change in the deferred tax asset attributable to net operating loss carryforwards divided 
by the deferred tax asset at the end of the prior year. 
OC = Change in the deferred tax asset attributable to carryforwards other than NOLs divided by 
the deferred tax asset at the end of the prior year. 
OPEB = Change in the deferred tax asset attributable to other postretirement benefits divided by 
the deferred tax asset at the end of the prior year. 
DC = Change in the deferred tax asset attributable to deferred compensation divided by the 
deferred tax asset at the end of the prior year. 
 
 
 
 
 27
REFERENCES 
 
Archibald, T. R. (1967). The return to straight-line depreciation: An analysis of a change in 
accounting methods. Journal of Accounting Research, 4(Supplement), 164-180. 
 
Bartov, E. (1993). The timing of asset sales and earnings manipulation. The Accounting Review, 
68(4), 840-855. 
 
Duke, J. C., & Hunt, H. G. (1990). An empirical examination of debt covenant restrictions and 
accounting-related debt proxies. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 12(1/3), 45-63. 
 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (1987). Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 
96, Accounting for Income Taxes. Stamford, CT: Author. 
 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (1992). Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 
109, Accounting for Income Taxes. Stamford, CT: Author. 
 
Healy, P. M. (1985). The effect of bonus schemes on accounting decisions. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, 7(1-3), 85-107. 
 
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976, October). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, 
agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 305-360. 
 
Meyer, M. J., Karim, K. E., & Gara, S. C. (2000). Political costs and accounting method choice: 
The pharmaceutical industry. The Mid-Atlantic Journal of Business, 36(4), 193-215. 
 
Miller, G. S., & Skinner, D. J. (1998). Determinants of the valuation allowance for deferred tax 
assets under SFAS 109. The Accounting Review, 73(2), 213-233. 
 
Press, E. G., & Weintrop, J. B. (1990). Accounting-based constraints in public and private debt 
agreements: Their association with leverage and impact on accounting choice. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, 12(1/3), 65-95. 
 
Visvanathan, G. (1997, August). An empirical analysis of deferred tax assets as reported under 
SFAS No. 109. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Accounting Association, 
Dallas, TX. 
 
Visvanathan, G. (1998). Deferred tax valuation allowances and earnings management. Journal of 
Financial Statement Analysis, 3(4), 6-15. 
 
Watts, R. L., & Zimmerman, J. L. (1978). Towards a positive theory of the determination of 
accounting standards. The Accounting Review, 53(1), 112-134. 
 
White, G. (1970). Discretionary accounting decisions and income normalization.  Journal of 
Accounting Research, 8(2), 260-274. 
 
